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Abstract The MDGs appear to have been more influential than most other attempts at international target-
setting in the field of development, at least at the level of international discourse. But has this translated into
impact on either development policy or resource allocation, and if so has the impact been constructive or not?
And what lessons does this suggest for any future target-setting proposals?
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1 Introduction
The Millennium Declaration of 2000 was a wide-
ranging statement, agreed by all UN members,
giving a vision of a fairer and more sustainable
future for the world, and in particular for its
poorer countries and citizens. The Declaration
also set out a number of specific targets to be met
by 2015 (or in one case, 2020). These provided
the basis for the more detailed structure of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), of
which the authoritative version was contained in
an Annex to a ‘Road Map’ produced by the
Secretary-General in September 2001. This set
out the structure of eight Goals, 18 Targets and
48 Indicators that has constituted the MDG
framework. This structure was updated following
the UN Summit Session of 2005, and now
incorporates 21 Targets and 60 Indicators.
It is noteworthy that the Annex to the ‘Road
Map’ was not formally endorsed by the UN
membership, but merely described as ‘a useful
guide’ in the relevant Resolution,1 and that the
subsequent updating has been carried out by the
so-called Inter-Agency and Expert Group on the
Millennium Development Goal Indicators, a
body whose status is pleasingly unclear.2
Nevertheless, despite this less than robust formal
basis, there can be no doubt that the MDGs have
become highly influential at least at the level of
international discourse about development.
Significant resources are allocated to tracking
them; the UN leads the production of annual
reports about them, convenes regular Summit
Sessions about them, and sponsors an ongoing
‘Millennium Campaign’; the World Bank and IMF
put together an annual ‘Global Monitoring Report’
about them; and no G8 summit is complete without
some reference to them. A special summit session
of the UN General Assembly to review progress will
take place in September 2010, and there will be
much discussion of a ‘big push’ to secure the
maximum progress on the various Goals by 2015.
This article asks whether there is evidence that
the MDGs have had impact in the ‘real world’ of
choices about development strategy and resource
allocation; whether such influence as exists is
constructive or not; and what lessons might be
drawn for any subsequent attempt to define
development Goals on an international level
after 2015.
The basic documents of 2000–01 do not specify
the purpose of the MDGs. I have argued
elsewhere (Manning 2009) that their purpose is
‘to encourage sustainable pro-poor development
progress and donor support of domestic efforts in
this direction’, and this article takes this as a
core assumption.
2 Have the MDGs affected development policy or
resource allocation?
It would be as well to make clear at the outset that
it is intrinsically hard to separate out the impact of
targets from the environment that created them.
Thus the MDGs have a strong focus on health
(three of the eight Goals are health-related) and
official development assistance for health has
increased rapidly. But health, and particularly
child health, has long been a natural focus for the
donor community and for development advocates,
and it is not easy to distinguish the particular
impact of the MDGs. Indeed, in one striking case,
it is clear that resourcing decisions had nothing to
do with the MDGs as such: thus the Bush
Administration, a robust critic of the MDGs,
became by far the largest financial supporter of
HIV/AIDS programmes, not because of MDG 6
but because of an alliance of interests including
the views of core Republican supporters such as
the ‘Religious Right’.
Recognising the likely limitations of our ability to
separate out the impact of the MDGs in a wholly
convincing way, let us look at what can be said first
about the impact on the donor community and
second (but more importantly) at country level.
2.1 Impact on donors
Most individual donor governments (and the EU
collectively) have made specific and regular use of
the MDGs in domestic dialogue about the purpose
and effectiveness of development spending. The
USA, under the Bush Administration, and Japan,
which made no reference at all to the MDGs in
their 2003 ‘ODA Charter’, have been important
exceptions to this. China is among several donors
outside the traditional Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) grouping which has also stated
that its aid is aimed at supporting local efforts to
achieve the MDGs. Most international agencies
have also paid much attention to progress or the
lack of it against the MDGs, particularly where
the agency has a mandate closely relevant to one
or more MDG. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria is a particularly clear
example of a funding agency where the MDGs
(specifically MDGs 4, 5 and 6) are central to the
agency’s DNA.
A study of 21 DAC members by Sakiko Fukuda-
Parr (see this IDS Bulletin and Fukuda-Parr
2008) however points out that donors’ policy
documents typically pay considerable attention
to issues not explicitly covered in the MDGs,
notably in the areas of promoting peace, security
and human rights.3 These are aspects covered by
the Millennium Declaration, but not specifically
addressed by the MDGs as such. Some issues
that loom large in the MDGs, for example
employment, hunger, maternal mortality, child
survival, gender equality, social integration and
science and technology, were given relatively low
attention in these documents. There is still
however a solid core of coherence between donor
policy statements and the MDGs.
As to whether the existence of the MDGs has
affected resource allocation by donors, for the
reasons given above it is not possible to give an
unambiguous answer. Undoubtedly, the
proportion of aid going to the productive sector
(not directly covered by the MDGs) has fallen,
and the proportion to social sectors (well-covered
by the MDGs) has risen. Some donors have, for
example, massively increased support of basic
education, to the point where there have been
concerns expressed about an imbalance of aid
spending on education in favour of basic
education (after several decades of a pronounced
focus on tertiary, and for some donors, on
vocational education). This emphasis has very
likely been stimulated by the MDG for universal
basic education. However, this phenomenon has
been limited in practice to a small number of
donors, for example the Netherlands and the UK.
Similarly, the MDGs have probably encouraged
further concentration on infant and child health,
and the linked problems of infectious diseases, and
the rise of global funds to tackle immunisation and
disease-specific interventions has gone hand-in-
hand with the development of the MDG
philosophy,4 even though there is certainly no
simple relationship. The MDGs have also had
some success in stimulating greater focus among
some donors on widely neglected problems such as
maternal mortality5 (but to date with depressingly
little well-documented impact), but nutrition
appears to have been a counter example where
despite the existence of a clear Target under MDG
1, little donor focus has been evident.6
Some would argue that the MDGs, and their DAC
predecessor of 1996, have had a negative impact
on donors’ thinking through discouraging
worthwhile investment in the productive sectors
and in infrastructure, none of which are explicitly
captured by the way the MDGs are framed (with
the exception of water and sanitation – a Target –
and information communication technologies – an
Indicator). This is sometimes seen as a promotion
of welfare and aid dependence over growth and
self-reliance.
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It is hard to separate out the impact of the MDGs
from other factors that have led to significant
changes in the share of such sectors in ODA.
OECD figures (OECD DAC 2004) show that the
share of ODA to agriculture turned down sharply
as long ago as the late 1980s – perhaps as a result
of the poor experience with ambitious projects for
rural development. For energy, where the major
decline in share was a decade later, the DAC
Goals could have had some relevance, but it is
likely that the ‘Helsinki Disciplines’, which in
practice ended tied aid for power stations and
other financially viable projects, were more
influential. For industry, where there has been a
secular decline from the 1980s onwards,
liberalisation of the economy is likely to have
been as significant as ‘MDG thinking’.
Perhaps the most far-reaching and positive
influence of the MDGs on donors – although one
hard to measure – has been in strengthening the
view that if support for aid is to be sustained,
measurable progress must be shown in areas that
the public in donor countries view as desirable.
This is arguably far healthier than the
traditional ‘establishment-based’ model, where
aid programmes (other than humanitarian aid)
were greeted with a high degree of indifference
by the public and most strongly supported by
public and private interests with something to
gain from the influence of aid in securing either
political or commercial advantage. This shift in
perception is by no means universal, and
knowledge of the MDGs in donor countries is
still not widespread, but it has arguably made it
harder for governments to ‘sell’ development aid
that does not contribute to real development
progress. Organisations such as ONE, with its
annual ‘DATA’ Report, encourage a focus on
MDG outcomes as well as on delivery of aid
commitments.
2.2 Impact on developing countries
While it is historically true that the MDGs owed
a great deal to the DAC International
Development Goals, put together very much as a
tool for donors to justify continuing investment
in aid programmes at a time when they were
falling significantly, the ultimate value of the
MDGs in changing behaviour and outcomes will
depend much more on their impact at country
level. It is therefore unfortunate that there is not
as yet much accumulated research evidence of
the extent of such impact, if any.
Sakiko Fukuda-Parr’s study referred to above
examined 22 Poverty Reduction Strategies,
covering 17 less-developed countries, two other
low-income countries and three lower middle-
income countries. She found that almost all
stated a commitment to the MDGs, but that the
focus was quite selective. In some respects, this
mirrored the approach of the donors (e.g. serious
attention to social sector spending, but little
attention to hunger and nutrition, decent work
and technology transfer), and in others it differed
significantly (a greater focus on economic growth,
little attention to democracy, freedom of the
media or human rights). Targets were often set
for several MDG priorities, Targets often in fact
more ambitious than the MDGs and reflecting
local results frameworks such as Tanzania’s
‘Vision 2025’. On the other hand, the calculations
supported by the UN Millennium Project of the
investment needed to meet the MDGs dependent
on public services were not referred to, nor were
these fully incorporated into the countries’
planning and budgeting.
The United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) conducted its own survey of progress
against the MDGs in 30 countries in 2009 (UNDP
2009). This demonstrated the wide variety of
situations, some countries (generally the better
off, such as Bahrain) making virtually no use of
the MDGs as a way of measuring or incentivising
progress, but a large number having integrated
the MDGs (or often a locally adapted version)
into their own development planning.
Indeed, the ‘customisation’ of the MDGs is a
notable feature brought out by the study. Of the
30 countries, ten had added or modified Goals.
Thus, for example, Albania, Iraq and Mongolia
had added a Goal on good governance and/or
fighting corruption; Armenia, Cambodia,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had included eight or
nine years of education for all children as
modification of Goal 2; and Colombia and
Mongolia had added relevant national infectious
diseases to Goal 6. Some 15 countries had added,
expanded or modified Targets, and no fewer than
25 had added, expanded or modified Indicators,
for example to reflect national poverty lines. Such
steps imply at least a measure of local ownership
of the MDGs among a wide variety of countries.
Even where the government’s planning documents
are not built around the MDGs as such, MDG-type
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outcome Targets are usually visible. A particularly
significant example is India, where the Eleventh
National Plan (2008–2012) includes 27 time-bound
targets, of which 13 can be disaggregated at State
level. The targets fall into six categories covering:
income and poverty; education; health; women and
children; infrastructure; and the environment.
Targets include clean drinking water for all by
2009, halving infant malnutrition by 2012, and
reducing maternal mortality to one per 1,000 live
births by the same year. The approach is highly
consistent with the MDG concept.
UNDP also notes the value of the MDGs (or of
local adaptations) to advocacy and campaigns for
better conditions for the poor. It notes that the
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in putting
forward the Goals in his ‘Road Map for the
Implementation of the MDGs’ of 2001, had
noted that a powerful purpose was ‘to mobilise
people power in the fight against poverty and
inequality’. There is a good deal of anecdotal
evidence that in some countries, Indicators
drawn from the MDGs have become an
increasing focus of civil society campaigning in
developing countries. The UN Millennium
Campaign is seeing some significant resonance
in developing countries (over 116 million people
in about 110 countries took part in its ‘Stand Up
for the MDGs’ campaign in 2008), and other
advocacy groups such as African Monitor use the
MDGs routinely as a basis for campaigning.
Evidence of impact on resource allocation is
scarce. The OECD (2007) quote figures from the
World Development Indicator database, which
suggest that public spending on health in
developing countries rose from 2.6 per cent of
GDP in 2000 to 2.8 per cent in 2004, and on
education from 3.9 per cent to 4.3 per cent.
These figures cannot be broken down by sub-
category (e.g. basic education), and while the
increases are positive, they are in a context of
rising expenditure/GDP ratios more generally.
A preliminary conclusion might be that, as with
the donors, the MDGs have so far had more
influence on political discourse than on resource
allocation in developing countries. This is
particularly so for documents such as Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), which are
designed in large measure to satisfy the demands
of the donor community. However, the increasing
use of customised MDG-based outcomes as a
basis for local discussion of progress suggests
that the potential of the MDGs to change
behaviour over time might be significant.
More generally, it seems likely that the MDGs
have had some impact, both for donors and for
developing countries (including civil society
actors as well as the official sector) in the way
that issues are framed. As Carol Weiss argued
(Weiss 1977), the generalisations that flow from
research findings provide decision-makers with a
way of framing the issues: the MDGs are an
example of an Indicator set that has certainly
had some influence of this kind.
3 Has the influence of the MDGs been
constructive?
The previous section has argued that the
influence of the MDGs on real-world behaviour
has so far been modest, although it has also
pointed to indications that the MDG approach
might become more influential over time, both
for donors and for developing countries. If this is
the case, it is worth examining whether the
influence is likely to be constructive or not.
The view of many advocacy groups7 appears to be
that the MDGs are in general a highly positive
advocacy tool, and that substantial revisions (not
likely before 2015) would be unwelcome.
Aspects they appreciate include:
z The MDGs recognise the multidimensional
nature of poverty – as opposed to the more
piecemeal declarations of specialist
international conferences.
z The MDGs are relatively comprehensible for
the non-specialist public.
z The ‘parsimony’ of the headline MDGs (despite
the large number – over 60 – of Indicators) aids
comprehension and understanding.
z The period for showing results is neither too
short to be credible nor too long to exert
pressure.
At the same time there is no shortage of critics
of the MDGs, in civil society and academic
circles in particular. Key critiques include:
z They are too ‘one-size-fits-all’ (Vandemoortele
2009)
z They are unrealistically ambitious, at least for
many countries (Clemens et al. 2007)
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z They ‘ghetto-ise’ development as a Southern
problem, rather than linking it to Northern
lifestyles (Saith 2006). In addition, Goal 8, the
main one with an impact beyond developing
countries, lacks any deadlines, and consequently
the MDGs ‘let the donors off the hook’
z They pay too little attention to inequality or
to empowerment of the poor (Watkins 2008;
Vandemoortele 2009)
z They are ‘anti-growth’ (Chang 2008)
z Key dimensions of development are omitted
(e.g. human rights and other important topics
of the Millennium Declaration)
z Many parameters are poorly specified (e.g.
the focus on education enrolment without
reference to education outcomes, the
Indicators on environment and gender).
The energy of the debate on these and other
items suggests that, consistently with my
comments on impact above, many commentators
do see at least the potential of impact, and are
concerned that aspects of the MDGs may have
negative consequences.
It is hard to say at this stage whether the
construction of the MDGs has had any negative
consequences in practice. To take an example, it is
clear that enrolment in basic education has
increased in many African countries with so far
quite disappointing results for numeracy and
literacy of school leavers, but it is less obvious
whether the failure of the relevant MDG to look
beyond enrolment can be considered a material
cause (as opposed, let’s say, to the political
attractions of announcing free basic education and
the willingness of donors to support it versus the
sheer hard graft of training and hiring teachers,
revising the curriculum, and putting in place good
incentives for learning). Nevertheless, many of the
critiques have force, and could and should be
attended to in any post-2015 results framework.
4 What lessons might be drawn for subsequent
attempts to define development Goals on an
international level after 2015?
As 2015 approaches, increasing attention is likely
to be paid to the question of whether any further
MDG-type results framework should be put in
place for a future period.
The first key questions are: What would be the
purpose of any new framework? Should it
continue to be about sustainable, pro-poor
development progress (i.e. a core focus on
poverty in all its dimensions) or should it be
more about how we can collectively mange the
planet in the medium term? Clearly, many issues
would be common to both, since sustainable
poverty reduction requires progress on issues
such as climate change and conflict resolution,
which would undoubtedly feature heavily in an
Indicator set designed to encourage better
collective management of the planet, and
poverty reduction would surely itself be one issue
that better collective management of the planet
would necessarily address. However, the choice is
a significant one, both on substance (e.g. Would
the latter approach in practice marginalise the
poverty agenda?) and on process (How would an
Indicator set for better planetary management –
something affecting a huge range of agencies
and interests – be negotiated?). This issue
parallels the question of whether the ‘aid
business’ will increasingly mutate into a ‘global
public goods business’, something already
highlighted in the Climate Change negotiations.
Any post-2015 framework should maintain good
features of the MDGs including:
z Parsimony at Goal level, and to the extent
possible also at Target level, probably using a
structure similar to that of the MDGs, with no
more than ten top-line Goals,8 ideally few if
any more Targets (maybe 25 should be the
upper limit) than in today’s MDGs, but
perhaps rather more Indicators (e.g. 80 in
place of the current 60), in order to respond to
reasonable demands for somewhat more
comprehensive measurement of progress in
addressing poverty
z A time-span of around 15 years for reaching
the Targets9
z A process for updating the Targets and
Indicators that is sufficiently tightly managed
to guarantee stability in the core design, while
allowing for modest flexibility. As with the
present set, Goals themselves, which would be
written as broad and unquantified objectives,
should not be altered during the life of the
framework
z Comprehensible language, particularly at
Goal level.
However, the framework should also respond to
valid critiques. Among these I would put
particular weight on the following:
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1 Targets for desired outcomes should be set at
either global level or for developing countries
as a group,10 not at individual country level,
although the ‘global’ targets could and should
be used to encourage more rapid progress at
country level. All countries should be invited
(as was done at the Jomtien Education
Conference of 1990) to set their own national
targets for each goal, ideally but not
necessarily for the same period of 15 years,
and ideally through some bottom-up process.
Some regions or sub-regions might choose to
do likewise. It is interesting in this connection
to note the rise of more community-based
setting of outcome frameworks in many
countries, as demonstrated at the OECD
Global Forums on Measuring the Progress of
Societies. Such approaches could very well
complement a continued set of internationally
agreed Goals and Targets.
2 The global targets should be carefully based
on evidence of current rates of progress. They
should be stretching but not unachievable at
‘global’ level.
3 While a focus on reducing and eliminating
absolute poverty should be kept, relative
poverty should be recognised more clearly as
an issue. Targets and Indicators should
therefore make transparent what is
happening at each income quintile for the
parameter concerned (Jan Vandermoortele
has suggested ways of weighting progress at
each quintile to bring this information to a
single number, which could also be a way of
ensuring that there is no bias towards
progress for those just below any Target at the
expense of those much further from it).
Gender disaggregation should also be
displayed internationally, as it theoretically
should be at present,11 but too seldom is in
MDG reports. At country level, there should
be encouragement to disaggregate data in
other relevant ways, for example by province.
4 The dimension of human rights should be
included, based on the Millennium
Declaration. There should certainly be a Goal
in this area, and ongoing work on Indicators
(see e.g. Alkire 2007) (including on
empowerment) should be pursued with a view
to devising some meaningful Target at global
level.
5 There should at least be Indicators on the
productive sector and on economic
infrastructure. A Goal for greater
‘connectivity’, incorporating Targets on access
to core infrastructure services such as water
(already included), telecommunications
(partially covered in Goal 8), power and
transport (illogically excluded), should be
considered.
6 Poorly specified Targets in the present set
should be looked at critically. These certainly
include education, gender and environment
(where the outcome of Climate Change
negotiations will need to be reflected in some
appropriate way). The relevant policy
communities should make proposals in the
light of some upfront guidance (including on
points 1–3 above) so that such proposals are
consistent with the overall architecture.
7 The present Goal 8 needs radical revision.
Some of its elements could be dropped or
moved elsewhere (e.g. ICT to the separate
‘connectivity’ Goal mentioned above). The
references to the problems of particular
groups of developing countries could be dealt
with by more thoroughgoing disaggregation of
reporting of each Target and Indicator. But
the concept of a Goal on the enabling
environment for poverty reduction makes
sense and should be kept. What is harder to
agree on is Targets in this area, not least given
the increasing significance of the policies of
major middle-income countries to sustainable
pro-poor growth in a ‘G20 World’. Again, the
approach might be to set global targets for
areas such as trade openness and concessional
resource transfer, leaving individual countries
(certainly including all G20 members and all
OECD and EU members) to determine what
they will specifically commit to, enabling peer
pressure to be maintained on laggards within
each grouping, while recognising that it would
be unreasonable to demand the same degree
of trade openness or resource transfer for
countries whose economic situations are
objectively very different.
5 Conclusion
Indicator sets such as the MDGs should not be
oversold as some sort of magic bullet to
accelerate the achievement of desirable Targets.
All such achievements require hard work,
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commitment and financial and human resources.
But they can affect the way people think, and
over time that influence may well affect how
people and institutions behave. The experience
so far with the MDGs suggests that an
investment in an improved set of Goals, Targets
and Indicators for perhaps a further 15-year
period after 2015 would be worth making. It will
probably be more difficult to develop a consensus
on the structure and content of such a set than
was the case in 2000–01, in a world very different
from that in which the original MDGs were
conceived and put in place. It is therefore
desirable that informal discussion of options with
as wide a group of interested parties as possible
should be encouraged. Before long, an
international process – presumably under the
auspices of the UN – will need to be put in place,
in a way that does not distract attention from the
need to make rapid progress towards the present
Goals by 2015. This article suggests some possible
substantive changes in the present MDG
framework that any such process could consider.
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Notes
1 See the 56th General Assembly resolution
GA/9999 Plenary, 14 December 2001, 86th
Meeting.
2 The Group, set up in 2002, includes the UN
Secretariat, a number of UN agencies, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF),
International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), national experts from statistical
offices and representatives of other
organisations concerned with the development
of data for the MDGs.
3 The DFID White Paper and the
Conservatives’ Green Paper of July 2009 both
have a strong focus in this direction, while
also paying attention to the issue of progress
against the MDGs.
4 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis
and Malaria was established in 2002; the
Global Alliance on Vaccines and
Immunisation was established in 1999, but
although this preceded the Millennium
Declaration and the MDGs, this was well after
the OECD/DAC had promulgated the
International Development Targets, which
had objectives for reducing child mortality
identical to the MDGs, and indeed drawn
from UN Summits of the early 1990s.
5 This became an area of specific attention in
DFID’s then Asia Division in the early 2000s,
for example. In September 2009, UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and France’s
First Lady, Carla Bruni-Sarkozy, joined to
promote a campaign to halt all mother-to-
child transmission of HIV/AIDS by 2015.
6 See for example, IDS Bulletin 40.4.
7 This was clearly stated, for example by both
Northern and Southern advocacy groups at a
DFID Seminar on the future of the MDGs in
March 2009.
8 The discussion below proposes Goals for both
Rights and for Connectivity, which would
represent a net addition of two. This might
however be offset by a rationalisation of the
health Goals, while maintaining the present
number of health Targets.
9 The MDGs were agreed with, in effect, a 15-
year time horizon, complicated however by a
baseline implicitly set ten years earlier,
something that there is no case to repeat.
10 ‘Developing countries’ is a term of very
modest usefulness, given the disparities
among them. However, it is difficult to see any
UN-endorsed process using a different
categorisation, short of universal applicability,
although recognised sub-categories such as
the Least Developed and the Small Island
Developing States will no doubt (as in Goal 8)
receive some specific recognition.
11 Urban/rural disaggregation is also
theoretically written into the MDG
framework, but even less often displayed.
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